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Part II

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Abstract
From 1940s onwards and well into the 1970s, labour policy had revolved around principles of tripartism and protection of labour rights; in contrast, from the late 1980s onwards, policy discourse sought to legitimise a shift from protection of labour rights to a deregulation of labour laws. Major shifts in labour policy agendas were key to changes wrought by economic reforms of the early 1990s.

Part I raises questions about how we may map the influence of and continuities in policy agendas and contexts. Is policy influence synonymous with implementation? Deviating from the dominant view within development economics, we argue that policy frameworks can have an enduring influence and impact quite apart from whether they are implemented. Additionally, this part also offers an account of tripartism as a founding structural motif in sustaining labour market dualism and determining the course of labour policy agendas in post-colonial India.

Part II offers a historically oriented focus on two key policy reviews of this period between 1966 to 2006, namely reports of first National Commission of Labour [1966-1969] and the Second National Commission of Labour [1999-2002]. The records and reports of both these Commissions are analysed here in conjunction with key parliamentary and political debates of the period pertaining to labour policy.

Keywords: Policy analysis; Labour market dualism, Liberalisation; Labour market reforms; Politics of knowledge

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Part II

Elaborated over a two-fold structure in Parts I and II, this paper seeks to contextualise and historicize labour policy in an effort to reorient the analysis of social policy in necessary ways beyond the terrain of development economics. This analysis is based on a larger study to read major Indian labour policy and education policy documents in tandem to delineate shifts in terms and categories through the key junctures in development/planning agendas in the period between 1966 and 2010.

Comprising Sections 1 to 3, Part I draws on contributions from disciplines of history, political science, sociology and anthropology to development debates and structuring of state-society relations to elaborate a framework for qualitative analyses of policy documents. Section 1 considers how shifts in labour policy agenda were central to changing development priorities after the late 1980s even though labour market reforms were not addressed for a whole decade after reforms towards liberalisation of the economy. Against this, Section 2 raises questions about how we may map the influence of and continuities in policy agendas and contexts. Is policy influence synonymous with implementation, or must estimates of influence concede non-implementation as a part of the spectrum of possibilities in policy formulation? In other words, deviating from the ‘commonsense’ assumptions of development economics, we argue that policy frameworks can have an enduring influence and impact quite apart from whether they are implemented. Section 3 offers a brief discussion on tripartism as a founding structural motif in sustaining labour market dualism and determining the course of labour policy agendas in post-colonial India.

Comprising Sections 4 and 5, Part II offers a contextualised discussion of the FNCL and SNCL reports respectively. This paper offers a comparison of the Report of the FNCL and SNCL focussing on three aspects built around an analysis of the following elements in the two
Reports: terms of reference, composition and inaugural address; working procedures ranging from collection of evidence and responses through questionnaires, study groups, meetings, seminars, consultations with individuals and groups and; nature, pattern and orientation of questions in questionnaire and other tools, methods of data analysis and overall structure and organisation of report. In commenting on the above aspects, our main interest is in tracking how FNCL and SNCL regard labour market dualism and addressing the divide between the organised sector and unorganised sector. In the interests of conciseness, we frame the discussion of trajectory of post-1947 labour policy around three key, related themes: tripartism, rural/agricultural labour and the unorganised sector. Asserting that the influence or significance of these reports cannot be indexed by their mere non-tabling in Parliament, this enables us to foreground how the agenda of labour reform was built into and pushed through the working of the FNCL and SNCL.

4. FNCL: a qualitative analysis

The FNCL located itself squarely but critically within the framework of Nehruvian objectives of planned development. Labour Minister, Jagjivan Ram, had gone into some effort to ensure that the FNCL was headed by the pro-labour judge and eminent jurist, Mr. Gajendragadkar. Subsequent to his retirement as Chief Justice, the latter had agreed to the assignment on condition that he be allowed to be headquartered in Bombay to help his duties as current Vice-Chancellor of University of Bombay – from which he would make time to travel to the Commission office in Delhi for meetings as needed.

Ram could not make it personally to the inaugural meeting, also held in Bombay on January 18 1967. However the Labour Minister’s address read at the inaugural meeting emphasised the values of planning for harmonious industrial relations, the role of labour, responsibilities of industry to work not for profit alone. Not surprisingly, the framing emphasis on tripartism was key:

...labour policy that has been pursued since Independence can hardly be called the exclusive handi work of the Government. As you all know, tripartite forums, like the Indian Labour Conference and various Industrial Committees have given direction to Government’s labour policy. Though Government has naturally been initiating the policies, the organisations of workers and employers have not only played

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1 Gajendragadkar, ‘To the Best of my Memory”, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, p. 293.
their parts in policy making but has also shared a responsibility in deciding its manner of implementation. To what extent this system has succeeded and whether they or the Government have discharged their responsibilities are matters for the Commission to judge...

Management through persuasion, conciliation and adoption of flexible means and the need for industrial harmony, prominent as labour policy objectives were highlighted. However, the Labour Minister was equally emphatic in striking a forthright note in speaking of agriculture and rural labour:

You would have noted that in your terms of reference, special mention has been made of the conditions of rural labour and other categories of unorganised labour. Our labour policy has hitherto somehow overlooked this mass of workers even though they constitute the bulk of those who produce goods and provide services.

If social security for labour in the organised sector was a priority, equally the need to extend legislative protection to contract labour was prominently signalled:

There are laws for protecting labour in factories, mines, plantations, road transport and bidi industry. I hope that contract labour will also soon enjoy a measure of legislative protection.

It was acknowledged that the Minimum Wages Act was meant to protect agricultural workers, yet beyond this nominal provision, little had been done for agriculture, rural industries, sanitary workers, scavengers and other workers who made up the bulwark of the economy:

But apart from the ineffectively and imperfectly implemented minimum wages law, the workers employed in agriculture and other rural industries have been by and large kept beyond the purview of labour legislation. The same is the fate of sanitary workers and scavengers. As Minister for Labour, I have a sense of guilt in this regard. When I was first called upon to take up the Labour portfolio, I went to Gandhiji for his blessings and his instruction to me was to take good care of those workers who were the most neglected. I cannot forget that I have not been able to carry out his desire... I hope it will be possible for the Commission to go into the question and make recommendations which will help to bring a better life to these workers who form the sheet anchor of our economy.[emphasis added].

Importantly, the government’s expectations from the Commission were outlined as follows, oddly even as the possibility of selective (or non-) implementation was already being hinted at:
...recommendations that will emerge from the deliberations of this Commission, will provide guidelines for labour policy for many years to come. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Commission’s recommendations would all be such as can be put into practice by the Government immediately after the submission of the report. They will have an enduring impact and call for continuing action, not by Government alone.

Further striking a peculiarly cagey note, it was also suggested that responsibilities to follow recommendations would not rest with the government alone; these would also need to be taken up by worker and employer organisations. Was this an effort to signal that government could not take on sole responsibility over implementation? Did the move to distribute responsibility gesture toward fault lines within the tripartite partnership? Or did it gesture to the leeway the government wanted to give itself through to conveniently disavow the authority that it otherwise claimed quite assiduously?

The Commission has been appointed by the Government and will submit its recommendations to the Government but the recommendations will relate not merely to what the Government has to do. I am sure, they will cover areas where action will be called for by others also, particularly by the workers’ and employers organisations.

Again, in the light of state’s substantial investments in industrial regulation through its policy of tripartism, seeking leadership and guidance from the government are oddly described as a ‘weakness’. In particular, organisations, are advised to be more self-reliant; hinting perhaps at corporate efforts to lean heavily on the state in dealing with burden of labour welfare:

I think it has been one of our weaknesses always to look to Government for initiative even when action is due by individuals or groups and it is in the interests of the individuals or groups themselves to take appropriate action. *This is of special importance in the field of organisations* [Annexure p.4]

Expectations that when appropriate groups and individuals must act independently without awaiting state directives are noteworthy, indicating that the tripartite partnership was less than equitable or smooth. The emphasis that individuals and groups were served better by appropriate independent action is conceptually close to the bilateralism in industrial relations that became the basis of labour policy in the years leading up to and from 1991, when
through a combination of covert and subsequently overt measures, the state sought to relinquish its own regulatory role, dismantle labour laws and weaken unions.²

Staying with FNCL, we note the Chairman’s equally forthright response, outlining the proper approach he would adopt to resolve conflicting views³ to uphold national good, taking equal care to present the case of unorganised labour with due fairness:

My effort throughout will be to... place before the Commission the conflicting ideas in their proper perspective. Labour, naturally, must be treated fairly particularly the claims of inarticulate unorganized labour. The case for the employers must also be considered fairly. But in assessing the respective claims of industry and employees, the requirement of a national good must always be borne in mind. That I think, will be the proper approach to adopt.

Implicitly acknowledging the core labour market dualism sustained through policy paradigms, the Commission seemed keen to strike a balance. Consider the concise note define its basic categories, placed at the head of the Report:

For the purposes of the Commission's work the term ‘labour’ and 'worker' will include, in addition to rural labour, all employees covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.⁴

The terms of reference⁵ did not mention either dualism or the unorganised sector by name, making it clear the Commission’s efforts would focus largely address issues relating to the

²The redefinition of labour regulation largely along bipartist lines was an overt aim in the proceedings of the SNCL when it was eventually set up in 1999: “…consistent with the spirit of the new context, and of interdependence is to settle disputes through bilateral discussions and negotiations. All efforts must be made to promote bilateralism based on mutual interests and universally accepted rights...” Report of SNCL p. 310.

³The Chairman took recourse to Indian philosophic thought in explaining how conflicting positions would be reconciled: “…it would usually be possible to resolve that conflict, provided we take recourse to two principles which are known to Indian culture for ages These principles are very simple: one principle is Sameeksha — You try to discriminate dispassionately between the pros and cons of both the competing concepts. The other principle is Samanway, synthesis I do not think that there is any problem which we may have to face during the course of our elaborate deliberations, which may ultimately defy our determined effort to find a rational solution to it. Rational or harmonious synthesis, attempting to resolve the conflict between the two competing ideas would be possible provided we make an earnest and determined effort to try to eliminate our personal affiliations and meet the challenge of the problem in an objective manner”, p. A8(Appendix III).

⁴Ibid; pp.1.

⁵The terms of reference are noted as:

(1) To review the changes in conditions of labour since Independence and to report on existing conditions of labour... (2) To review the existing legislative and other provisions intended to protect the interests of labour, to assess their working and to advise how far these provisions serve to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution on labour matters and the national objectives of establishing a socialist society and achieving planned economic development;
(3) To study and report in particular on—
(i) the levels of workers’ earnings, the provisions relating to wages, the need for fixation of minimum wages including a national minimum wage, the means of increasing productivity, including the provision of incentives to workers;
(ii) the standard of living and the health, efficiency, safety, welfare, housing, training and education of workers and the existing arrangements for administration of labour welfare— both at the Centre and in the States;
(iii) the existing arrangements for social security;
(iv) the state of relations between employers and workers and the role of trade unions and employers' organisations in promoting healthy industrial relations and the interests of the nation;
organised sector. Thus notwithstanding the above-noted inclusive gestures towards rural, agricultural and contract labour, echoing the premises of tripartism and foundational beliefs of development theory, the FNCL agenda and structure of the report only underscored the primacy that post-1947 labour policy accorded to the organised sector. This was clearly brought out by the allocation of space within the report. Even while being fully cognisant of the miniscule share of the organised sector in overall employment, after the introductory set of chapters and Chapters 2-6 to review and summarise the Commission’s work and findings, the bulk of the report [Chapters 7-27] were devoted to issues pertaining to the organised sector. In marked contrast, only two [Chapters 28, 29] out of a total of 33 chapters focus on agricultural labour and the unorganised sector respectively. Despite this preponderance, the pronouncements are far from being one-sided or skewed to idealize the norms, standards or achievements of the organised sector. Nor is there any hint of a derogatory approach towards the constituents or performance of the unorganised sector.

Equally, although the stakes being drawn strongly in favour of the organised sector, there is little evidence of attempts to deny the importance of or magnitude of dependence on the unorganised sector or to describe it mainly in negative terms. Equally, there are few signs of projections of unorganised sector unemployment as a temporary ‘waiting room’ until the organised sector expanded eventually to absorb those in informal employment. It is also significant that no fuss is made over difficulties in defining the unorganised sector or this becoming an alibi for an unwillingness to discuss it with due seriousness. Clearly, as the ‘other’ of the organised industry, here in the FNCL report, unambiguously, the unorganised sector has only a derivative identity. Thus we are told:

We now take up for discussion the issues connected with another group of workers, who cannot be identified by a definition but could be described as those who have not been able to organise in pursuit of a common objective because of constraints operating singly or in combination such as (a) casual nature of employment, (b) ignorance and illiteracy, (c) small size of establishments

(v) the labour laws and voluntary arrangements like the Code of Discipline, Joint Management Councils, Voluntary Arbitration and Wage Boards and the machinery at the Centre and in the States for their enforcement;
(vi) measures for improving conditions of rural labour and other categories of unorganised labour; and
(vii) existing arrangements for labour intelligence and research; and

(4) To make recommendations on the above matters.

6 See FNCL Report page no.417
with low capital investment per person employed, (d) scattered nature of establishments, and (e) superior strength of the employer.

Similarly the lack of firm and data and statistics are not cited as grounds to skirt issues. This derivative definition notwithstanding, the adherence to development theory did not totally nullify the room to heed to the conditions of the unorganised workforce. We are told that three of the thirty Study Groups set up were meant to especially to understand the problems of the following categories of unorganised workers (i) construction workers, (ii) sweepers and scavengers, and (iii) tribal labour.\(^7\)

**Method of Work**

The Commission was free to evolve its own procedure for work and for framing its report. Three Committees, thirty Study Groups and five Working Groups were set up within the FNCL to investigate various issues connected with terms of reference. Each group drew upon (a) the expertise of its members, (b) the relevant material on the whole area of the Commission's work on the concerned industry/subject, and (c) information which would help project thinking on the challenges in the area in the years to come.

Most significantly, many of these Study Groups were set up to be headquartered outside Delhi. Operations of these groups were thus distributed across many parts of the country, drawing upon regional networks from headquarters that included cities of Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Madras, Bangalore, Pune, Jaipur, Kolkata, Ranchi, among others. The conclusions reached by these committees groups are reviewed and their implications clearly laid out in the report. Even when some suggestions made were not accepted in the Report, attaching due importance to these views from knowledgeable persons, the same were placed on record and acknowledged in the report.

An equally balanced approach come through in the way the work of information gathering was planned; the proposed method of work was systematically and meticulously laid out, as would be expected from a distinguished jurist. The Chairman considered the present Commission to be far more fortunate than its predecessor, the Royal Commission of Labour

\(^7\) pp. 417.
or the Whitley Commission. He noted the FNCL had the advantage of a vast availability of published material. The FNCL consulted a voluminous literature⁸: We gather that the library of the Department of Labour and Employment prepared bibliographies on selected topics while assistance was made available by the International Labour Office, Geneva, on international experience. Even with this fund of information and statistics, special efforts had to be made to comprehend changes which had taken place with regard to certain categories of labour, particularly in agriculture and small scale industries. In some other areas, where statistical support was not available, the Commission relied on the assessment of experts. These sources were supplemented with requests for materials from Central and State Governments, and memoranda from central organisations of employers and workers to prepare material under the following broad headings used to cover the entire area of inquiry: (1) wages, earnings and productivity; (2) social security; (3) conditions of work; (4) industrial relations; (5) rural and other unorganised labour; (6) labour research and intelligence; (7) organisation and functions of the Department of Labour; (8) international obligations; (9) tripartite consultative machinery and its impact on labour policy; and (10) employment and training (p.3).

Framing a questionnaire was the next task. The commission thought it fit to make the questionnaire elaborate but leave adequate room to add to the issues if desired. The circular issued with the questionnaire emphasised the need for re-examining the principles on which the current labour policy was framed. The questionnaire was widely circulated within the country. Some copies were also distributed in foreign countries among persons conversant with the Indian labour scene. The proportion of responses were said to be satisfactory. The

⁸Apart from the Report of the Whitley Commission, 1931, and the extensive studies made by the Labour Investigation Committee, 1946 (thereafter referred to as the Rege Committee), there have been reports of committees appointed by different Provincial/State Governments which reflected the conditions prevailing at the time of their reporting. In the same category could be placed official surveys of labour conditions in several industries and areas, but undertaken in different years. To cite a few, we had the reports of the two enquiries on agricultural labour, reports on labour conditions in industries, reports on family budget inquiries, and wages census. "Reports of minimum wages advisory committees, wage boards and special committees appointed to study changes in conditions of work in different sectors of employment including industries, small and large, transport of all types, trade and service organisations, financial institutions of different types, the two Pay Commissions, the Dearness Allowance Commissions, the Bonus Commission and Committees and Courts of Inquiry were other useful sources of material. The Annual Reports of Ministries of the Central Government and Departments of State Governments and the annual reports of employers' and workers' organisations which discussed the topical problems that affected the respective groups contained information, albeit subjective. The record of discussions in the Indian Labour Conference, the Standing Labour Committee, the Industrial Committees, Evaluation and Implementation Committees and similar bodies at the State level could also be put to some use. A fair measure of legislation was undertaken in the field of labour, particularly in the early years of Independence. Debates in Parliament and State Legislatures, leading to these enactments, formed equally valuable source material. On the interpretational side of the legislation, apart from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Courts, we had for our analysis the awards of the industrial tribunals, industrial courts and labour courts." FNCL Report: 1969, p. 3.
replies were processed in two ways. Manual tabulation was undertaken to bring out a qualitative assessment of the views of different categories of respondents. Services of a computer were availed of to bring out the quantitative dimension of category-wise responses to the various issues. The tables so prepared are being published separately. The report notes that both the tabulated qualitative evidence collected through the questionnaire was published in separate volume with the main report (p.3).

Expert guidance was sought on problems connected with (a) working conditions, (b) labour statistics, and (c) agricultural labour. This was facilitated through participation of Commission members in seminars and conferences on these themes. Some of these academic gathering were organised by academic institutions interested in labour problems. Under the Commission’s sponsorship. For the conferences, a known expert was requested to prepare a paper on the basis of his expertise and technical information. Written comments from invited experts were subsequently invited. Lastly, the Commission sought to cull our conclusions on the basis of detailed discussions of the paper and expert comments (p.5).

As noted above, efforts were made to identify informed and committed collaborators to form a decentralised network spread across the country. For recording evidence at State headquarters the following sequence was apparently adopted to tap the opinions and inputs of various constituents and civil society leaders, before approaching officials and government representatives. Sessions usually opened with a discussion with local union leaders in the State, followed by a round with employer organisations or groups of individual employers touching on the same range of topics. Meetings with eminent public personalities such as Vice-Chancellors, university teachers, research scholars and persons associated in some capacity with workers, employers or their organisations were arranged. Similarly, advice was sought from members of local legislatures. A final session at each State headquarters was devoted to the Government Departments/State Corporations and State public sector undertakings. Final meetings of the visit were with the State Labour Minister and other ministers and officials of the Labour Department to seek clarifications on evidence sent to us in writing by many persons/organisations who had appeared previously before the Commission (p.4). On some issues a deeper probe into certain points of the collected
evidence was thought necessary; suitable officers from the Commission’s Secretariat were deputed to make an on-the-spot inquiry and prepare a report.

A similar approach working their way up from information gathering to consultations to seek clarifications from the highest echelons of bureaucracy and state representatives at the Central level was also followed. Observational visits were planned to get acquainted with local situations. These inquiries and visits and discussions were followed by meetings with central organisations of employers and workers. Members of Parliament, particularly those known for taking a keen interest in rural and urban matters were met with to discuss the trend of evidence recorded on important aspects of the inquiry. Meetings with Secretaries to the Government of India, with officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs and with the Department of Labour and Employment took place as the penultimate round of discussions. The final round of discussions were with the Planning Commission and the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (p. 4).

5. SNCL: a qualitative review and comparison

Thirty years on from when the FNCL had submitted its report, the SNCL was set up in decidedly changed circumstances. In 1966, the mandate for FNCL was to evaluate labour policy with reference to implementing with respect to labour matters the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution. Such concerns with the state’s role in ensuring social justice had now undergone a drastic re-assessment. In marked contrast, in 1999 the SNCL was asked firstly to review existing labour legislation and recommend rationalization of labour laws in the organized sector, and secondly to suggest “umbrella” legislation for ensuring a minimum level of protection to workers in the unorganized sector. The SNCL was headed by ex-Labour Minister, Mr. Ravindra Varma. Apart from the Chairperson and Member Secretary, the SNCL had one full-time member and seven part-time members. Only two of the eight members were labour representatives; effectively only the Bhartiya Mazdoor Sabha [BMS] and Indian National Trade Union Congress [INTUC] were represented. Significantly, the BMS representative submitted a substantive note of dissent on the Review of Laws, annexed to
the SNCL report\textsuperscript{9}. Running into nearly 1500 pages, and comprising a total of thirteen chapters, the two chapters on review of laws [Chapters 5 & 6] and the single chapter [Chapter 7] on the unorganised sector comprise the bulkiest ones. Prone to circular reasoning and repeated use of unsubstantiated claims\textsuperscript{10}, the style of argument of the report was decidedly neither terse nor unequivocal.

If tripartism and an overt concern with labour rights and welfare in the organised sector had been the operative frameworks for FNCL inquiries, the SNCL mandate was to review labour legislation in line with the demands of making the Indian economy competitive in response to the forces of globalisation and decisions to liberalise Indian trade and industry. The Commission noted that the GoI Resolution forming the SNCL had directed attention to the need to ensure a minimum level of protection and welfare to labour, to improve the effectiveness of measures relating to social security, safety at places of work, occupational health hazards; to pay special attention to the problems of women workers, minimum wages, evolving a healthy relation between wages and productivity; and to improve the protection and welfare of labour.

However this now necessitated an urgent and comprehensive review of existing labour legislation, which in addition to being linked to ‘demands for reforms voiced in Labour Conferences for years’, was also justified as arising from the experiences that all social partners, entrepreneurs, workers and the State and Central Governments have had of the way the existing laws have worked. All three partners have complained that the laws are unsatisfactory. All wanted a comprehensive review, and reformulation of the legal framework, the administrative framework and the institutional structures in the field of social security.

Claiming to understand that ‘protection and welfare measures are required for those who are employed, as well as those who are unemployed; those who are prospective entrants, as well as those rendered incapable by debilitating disease, accidents or old age’, the Report elaborated on how it viewed the task of ‘rationalisation’ of existing laws.

\textsuperscript{9}See Annexure XVIII, C K Saji Narayanan [Advocate and trade union leader, Thissur, Kerala], Note of Dissent on Chapter on Review of Laws, dated 21.05.2002, SNCL Vol 2, 151-166.

The Chairman’s response in a note was included in Annexure IX. Highlighting the imperative that their ‘recommendations had also to be contextual, and capable of being practically implemented without detriment to the prospects of further upgradation or the interests of all sections of our people – all of whom had equal rights and duties as citizens’, the Commission had thought it necessary not “to put contextually impractical laws in the statute book [that] tend to become a dead letter, honoured by being overlooked or circumvented, - or become instruments that turn socially self-destructive.” We have tried to keep these considerations in mind while formulating our recommendations, even while safeguarding the scope for upgrading standards of life, liberty and endeavour. It added: “We regret that Shri Saji Narayanan did not find these considerations weighty enough to accept the consensus recorded in the Chapter on Laws. We are however very happy he has made it clear in his note of dissent, that he agrees with and welcomes the recommendations we have made in the other eleven chapters in the report.”

\textsuperscript{10}See below discussion on the visit to China and review of information gathered therein by SNCL economic reforms and labour flexibility in China.
In our understanding, rationalisation means only making laws more consistent with the context, more consistent with each other, less cumbersome, simpler and more transparent.

Attempts to thus mitigate the extent of change implicit in the SNCL’s assessments by camouflaging the full scope of what such an exercise of rationalization of laws entailed had to be read against preceding observations that in fact, it (was) ‘not possible or desirable to make specific recommendations without a comprehensive study’. Subsequent observations put such two-toned utterances in truer perspective. Elaborating on the envisaged nature of social protection, the Commission noted its task had been to consider ways to ensure social protection in the form of a scheme

to include assistance to meet exigencies as a result of unemployment, temporary unemployment, under-employment, accidents at places of work; insurance against accidents and occupational health hazards; the demands of pensionary, domiciliary and other kinds of care in old age; the need for housing, education of children, medical and nutritional care of the family and the constant upgradation of the skills necessary for continued employment.

However, while claiming that protection included ‘the ability to meet the essential requirements of life, as well as protection of the rights that are essential to ‘protect’ one’s bargaining power and social status, the Report was forced to concede the Commission assumed:

- the degree of protection will depend on the resources available to the State/society and the contributions that citizens/beneficiaries themselves can make.

Thus as far as SNCL recommendations went, the state was not to bear neither the moral nor legal responsibilities or the financial burden for providing social security cover. In linking legal norms and minimal standards of social protection to the state’s ‘ability to pay’, the SNCL was effectively redefining a basic tenet of the FNCL Report, which had categorically ruled against any discussions or estimates of an acceptable minimum wage being subject to considerations of its ‘affordability’ for the state. Quite ironically, now the costs of social security were to be passed on to the very vulnerable citizens whose survival was contingent on social protection!

**Study Groups, Work Procedures**
The Commission constituted six study groups on Social Security; Women & Child Labour; Umbrella Legislation for the Workers in the Unorganised Sector; Review of Laws; Globalisation and its impact and Skill Development, Training and Workers Education. Like the FNCL, the SNCL too gathered advice through consultations with expert opinion made available in the form of workshops and seminars conducted by the study groups. In all five seminars/workshops/ national level consultations were conducted on the following themes: Women Workers: An Agenda for the Future [March 19 & 20 2001]; Workshop on Child Labour [March 29 2001, New Delhi]; National Consultation on Future of Social Security in India [May 31 and June 1, 2001, New Delhi]; a National Consultation on Globalisation and its impact in three parts [October 20 2001, Bangalore; October 22 2001, in Mumbai; November 22-23, 200, New Delhi] and workshop on Skill Development, Training & Workers Education [November 2001, Bhubaneshwar].

The FNCL archive comprises detailed documentation, records and notes maintained and preserved for the FNCL for each one of its internal meetings; daily reports filed for field visits, domestic travel, foreign trips; written-up proceedings maintained for the range of consultations with trade union and employer groups regional experts, intellectuals and civil society leaders, MLAs, civil servants and officials at both state and national level, MPs, Ministry representatives and Planning Commission members; well-preserved full responses received to questionnaire and filed testimonies. As against this, we have so far only come across a record of cryptic, mechanical summaries of its internal meetings included in the report (Annexure XIV, SNCL Report Vol. 2, pp. 268-71). The possibility of further records for other consultations, including responses to questionnaires and discussions during consultations needs to be explored further.

The SNCL began work in November 1992, and commenced its task of recording evidence from Bombay. However, again in stark contrast with the respectful reception that the FNCL was met with, the SNCL found itself mired in controversy from the outset, and was often greeted with indifference, even deep skepticism\(^1\). As the SNCL report acknowledges, members were

\(^{11}\)See also K.S. Sundar 2000 for more details.
often closely questioned on how their agenda referenced the Gajendragadkar Commission [FNCL] report submitted in 1969:

almost in all the cities where we met representatives of trade unions and industrialists, labour lawyers and academicians, we were asked about the status of the recommendations of the Gajendragadkar Commission – how many of them had been accepted by the Government, how many of the recommendations accepted had been implemented, and why the other recommendations were rejected or not acted upon.

Forced to approach the Ministry of Labour for responses to these questions, the SNCL report admits the Commission did not receive ‘any information that could help [them], either to understand the position or to answer questions that were put to us by witnesses’. Not surprisingly, some witnesses even questioned SNCL members in turn, asking why the Commission members believed a new enquiry would help when the Report of the earlier enquiry was yet to receive full attention. The only justification that the Commission could offer was in alluding to the changed economic circumstances after globalisation and its visible impact on Indian industry.

Another measure of the weak footing that the SNCL found itself only a few months after commencing work, played out in relation to the Budget speech by Mr. Yashwant Sinha as Finance Minister on February 28 2001 in Parliament. The speech included announcements of a series of measures to amend existing labour laws, particularly the Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, which the government planned to introduce in the current Budget session of Parliament. The manner in which this announcement was made was unprecedented; moreover, it was widely perceived as stemming out of pressure brought to bear upon the government by corporate lobbies, who after welcoming the appointment of the SNCL but mistrustful of the long drawn-out consultative process, had made no secret of their impatience that changes in labour legislation need not await the submission of the Commission’s report [S. Sundar2000, p. 2609]. Deeply embarrassed, the Commission was compelled to write to the Government on March 7 2001, to bring to the government’s notice

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the very grave mood of introspection and sense of distress that have become evident in the minds of
most of the members of the Commission and its study teams after the Budget speech of the Hon. Finance
Minister in which he announced that the Government had decided to introduce legislation to amend the
Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act in the current Budget
session of Parliament... he not only indicated the possible direction of policy but also the specifics of the
amendments and the schemes that were going to be introduced, has given edge to the apprehensions
that are being articulated both by some members of the Commission and by many concerned groups...we
thought that since the Government itself had appointed the Commission and asked it to review all existing
legislation including the Industrial Disputes Act, the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, etc., it
would have waited for the report of the Commission...’. (Annexure XV, SNCL Report, Vol. 2, pp.272-75.)

Clearly many Commission members and advisors associated with study groups had sought
explanations from the Chairman, who noted:

   We deeply regret that both these alternatives were ignored, thereby giving an opportunity for skeptics
   and critics to say that the Government’s mind was already made up, and the Commission, therefore, had
   no relevance...Some distinguished members of our study teams have also expressed their deep concern,
   and asked whether, if the role of the Commission was really over and if the questions that were entrusted
to us had already been settled in the Government’s mind, there was any need for them to continue (ibid).

**SNCL, Deregulation, Labour Market Flexibility**

That no reply was received to this and a further reminder on the issue evidently did not
improved the public image of the SNCL. The less than transparent manner in which economic
reforms had proceeded has been highlighted in Part 1. In the same vein, procedures leading
up to appointment of the SNCL and those adopted by the Commission subsequently had done
little to inspire public confidence, alienating trade unions and significant sections of public
opinion. It was widely believed structures of tripartism which had been the cornerstone of
labour policy until the 1980s had been wilfully neglected for a decade or more leading up to
the appointment of the SNCL as part of a covert agenda to weaken trade unions and claims
of organised labour. In particular, trade unions believed that their viewpoints on the
composition, Chairmanship and terms of reference for the present exercise had been
pointedly ignored, thus effectively ensuring that the views of the Commission would be
entirely in consonance with the present consensus between government circles and
Corporate sector on the future course of labour policy.
Methods of reasoning and analysis adopted in the report persistently create an impression that the conclusions and recommendations of the SNCL Report do not demonstrate the necessary convergence with prior arguments and weight of evidence referenced or cited in the report. One of the most telling instances of this is the compelling and detailed discussion on review of economic reforms and labour legislation in China offered in Chapter 4. Ostensibly undertaken at the behest of those who felt that India’s efforts to dismantle labour laws to bring in a more stringent work-floor ethic and productive labour standards had much to learn from the Chinese economy, a SNCL delegation embarked on visit to the major industrial zones in Shenzhen, Guangdong and the Greater Shanghai Region. However, observations made and lessons learned through the various field visits, materials gathered and interviews conducted during the visit proved most instructive in unanticipated ways:

Perhaps those who advised us to recommend labour laws similar to what China has, may have second thoughts after seeing the provisions in the Chinese laws that we have quoted because the kind of freedom that they thought the entrepreneur had in China is not found in the laws as they exist (SNCL report Vol.2, p.22).

The experience served as quite an eye-opener that actually enabled SNCL members to acquire a critical perspective on the modalities through which economic reforms in India had been pursued:

It will be erroneous to think that ‘flexible’ labour laws are the main reason for China’s progress. We would also like to place on record the arguments and observations that have been put forward to explain why China has made spectacular progress in globalisation and the post-globalisation scenario, as compared to the tardy progress that India has made (ibid, p.23).

From the detailed and most interesting discussion in Chapter 5 on the Chinese strategy of economic reforms\(^\text{13}\), we cull out here four major reasons cited in the report for China’s position of strength

- China followed a policy of market economy since 1978. India introduced the new economic policy only in July 1991.
- China did not follow the standard policy prescriptions laid down by the World Bank and IMF for developing economies blindly.

\(^{13}\)See SNCL report, Vol.1, Chapter 4 Vol2, pp 20-23.
China gave lot of importance to provide excellent infrastructure of international standard in Shanghai, Shenzen and Guangdong provinces and attracted foreign enterprises over there.

While overseas Chinese played a very important role in attracting foreign investments, more significantly, China followed proper sequence of reforms. China, instead of initiating reforms with foreign trade and exchange rate liberalisation, started with agriculture. Then, China introduced export orientation for Township and Village enterprises. Then, special economic zones were opened which offered foreign investors excellent infrastructure, special fiscal and financial incentives and flexible labour relations by their innovative contract system.

A new policy was first tried in a small region, and after gaining experience of such a policy and the difficulties encountered, this policy with modifications was introduced in a wider area.

Through these unequivocal conclusions, the SNCL Report fully acknowledges it was not flexible labour laws but a pursuit of strategically consistent planned efforts to cover several dimensions of the transition to a market economy that enabled China to secure growth without compromising on social security. In other words, the visit to China had shattered the myth that ‘free-for-all’ levels of labour market flexibility had been the main inducement to attract foreign investment, which had allowed China to achieve spectacular progress. In other words, the visit to China had shattered the myth that ‘free-for-all’ levels of labour market flexibility had been the main inducement to attract foreign investment, which had allowed China to achieve spectacular progress.

Furthermore, the above discussion on the impact of globalisation in Chapter 5 also acknowledges how the outcomes of reform strategies adopted in India onwards had produced mixed results that revealed several worrying signs of increased economic instability. Among the limitations of Indian reform strategy, the SNCL report acknowledged failures on several counts: deregulation had not led to foreign investment in new enterprises; rather FDI flows had favoured acquisitions, leading to ceding of control to new managements and displaced offshore priorities, resulting in significant restructuring and job losses in Indian

See also SNCL Report Vol. 1, p. 305: “Elsewhere in our report, we have referred to laws in China that stipulate that a retrenched worker will be able to continue to reside in the residential accommodation provided by his retrenching employer for two to three years, receive a retrenchment compensation, a basic living allowance, limited access to medical facilities and facilities for retraining. In India, we do not have such legal provisions or practices. We wonder whether those who argue for the unfettered right to fire or retrench workers will accept the post-retrenchment responsibilities that Chinese law provides for, and consider whether they have the mind or resources to accept such responsibilities.”
Similarly, the opening up of Indian markets had led to an invasion of multinational brands and cheap imports from China, resulting in widespread closures of Indian manufacturing units in many sectors; the SNCL report even alludes to the entrepreneurial class in India reeling under a state of shock. Similarly trade liberalisation had meant escalation of inputs costs for farmers and increased exposure to high levels of volatility in agricultural markets and prices even as economic reforms paid little heed to investments in rural infrastructure. Equally the Report notes that financial and trade liberalisation had proceeded without necessary checks and balances to secure the banking systems and economy as a whole against repeated financial scams. The Report concluded that all this pointed to serious flaws in the reform strategies pursued in India, for which an increased labour market flexibility was a weak alibi with no likelihood of providing even the beginnings of a solution. Especially noteworthy are the observations on the neglect of the public sector through the reform process. Regretfully, despite the significant contributions of public sector enterprises through the turbulent 1990s, the Report noted:

...the new economic policy of liberalisation is that the policy has concentrated on the private sector and particularly in attracting foreign investment and trade liberalisation. The reform process has practically bypassed the public sector enterprises...The new policy of economic liberalisation neither specified any role to the public sector nor did it say anything about restructuring this sector so as to be made more useful and efficient (SNCL, Vol.2, p.22).

Similarly, the Report did not mince words in noting the short-sightedness of policies ‘aimed at attracting foreign investment of all varieties’, which had led to an unfortunate and severe neglect of agriculture:

...under influence of globalisation and pressures from international bodies like the IMF, World Bank, WTO etc., some of the vital sectors of the economy did not receive adequate attention. Take, for instance, agriculture and small-scale industries which provide largest employment and also contribute substantially to the growth of the GDP...During the decade after economic liberalisation, most of the state governments in their budget have reduced the share of investment and allocation to the rural sector...since insufficient investment is made in agriculture and rural areas, agricultural production has been affected adversely (ibid p.23).

This meant major repercussions ‘as agriculture was still the mainstay of the Indian economy and which provides employment to almost 60% of our population does not appear to have got the thrust it deserves.’ Oddly, failing to follow-up on these discerning insights, and in yet another significant contrast with the FNCL inquiry, the SNCL Report lacks a discussion of agricultural labour. The only passing references to agricultural labour occur under Wage
Policy and Labour Statistics in Chapter 13: Other Matters. Evidently this impinges upon the thrust of its ensuing arguments proffered in Chapters 5-7, namely, Approach to the Review of Laws, Review of Laws and Unorganised Sector. In the light of the foregoing analysis, the relentless case that the SNCL report makes for dismantling existing labour legislation in India, makes for acutely disquieting reading.

After SNCL, towards a conclusion

So, what does the course of events after the SNCL Report was submitted in June 2002 show? The following summary, excerpted from an agenda note for the 40th Session of Indian Labour Conference, scheduled for April 2005, is revealing:

The Second NCL submitted its recommendations in June 2002 which provided a draft of the model legislation for the unorganized sector workers. A bill was drafted for the unorganized sector workers immediately thereafter. Discussions, on a wide range of alternatives were held with the representatives of the State Government, Trade Unions and NGOs and others concerned at various forums including a two-day National Seminar on 7-8 November, 2002 and a workshop at V.V. Giri National Labour Institute. After detailed deliberations with all stakeholders, the Ministry of Labour & Employment drafted the ‘Unorganized Sector Workers Bill’. The Cabinet in its meeting of 6th November, 2003 decided that the Ministry of Labour instead of piloting a ‘Bill’, in the first instance should prepare a comprehensive scheme in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. A scheme was thus prepared viz: the “Unorganised Sector Workers Social Security Sechm-2003” and was launched in February, 2004 by the then Prime Minister. This was to be implemented by EPFO in 50 districts. However, the scheme could not be implemented properly due to the absence of statutory support and non-availability of appropriate implementing infrastructure. The scheme was also not proving viable because contribution from the employers was not forthcoming.\(^\text{15}\)

With hindsight, we now know also of the impressive work between 2006 and 2009 by the NCEUS headed by Arjun Sengupta. The NCEUS reports were not tabled in Parliament; yet their submission was followed by the introduction of The Unorganised Sector Workers’ Security Bill in Parliament in 2007, and the extensive deliberations held by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour with stakeholder groups, many of whom had met with the NCEUS.

Notwithstanding all these efforts and inputs, no tangible progress in the stated objective of providing social security to those in informal employment was made, until the four Labour Codes (see p. above) were finally passed as laws by Parliament amidst the post-COVID scenario in September 2020. A wider discussion on labour policy continuities and on the provisions of the four new Labour Codes is necessary, but will need to be taken up separately.

Through this paper we have sought to make an effective case for broadening the framework of policy analysis beyond exercises of cost-benefit analysis aimed at narrow assessments of the effectiveness of policy recommendations. Analysis of policy agendas and their shifting trajectories cannot merely set store by outcomes tied to ‘formal’ implementation. Rather than a mechanical assumption of formal implementation as a requirement or defining criteria of ‘successful’ policy, this paper brings out how close attention to the formulation and internal features of policy documents can yield deep insights into how policy agendas and institutional frameworks are made and remade through language. Taking post-1947 Indian labour policy as a classic example, and deviating from the ‘commonsense’ assumptions of development economics, this paper has shown how policy frameworks can have an enduring influence and impact quite apart from whether they are implemented.

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