Thursday, April 25
Fri
Mar
03

Does competition for multiple investors mitigate the hold-up problem?

Speakers:

Kaushal KishoreIISER Bhopal

 
03
March,
2023
03:30 PM to 05:00 PM (IST)

Abstract:-

Two symmetric countries compete over two-period under a non-preferential (preferential) taxation regime to attract multiple investors where investors are strategic and investments are sunk once invested. We compare tax revenues of competing countries when one investor enters the market with a scenario where two investors enter the market during the initial period keeping the amount of capital fixed. We show that the combined tax revenue of competing countries is higher when two investors enter the market during the initial period, that is, the presence of multiple investors mitigates the hold-up problem. We also show that the equilibrium tax revenues under non-preferential regimes are strictly higher than that under preferential regimes.

To register for this event please visit the following URL: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0sf-6ppzkrHNLffhANfCyUl6aiaV5FS2KE →

Date & Time

03-03-2023
03:30 PM
to 05:00 PM (IST)

Location

Anywhere

Event Type

IEG Seminar

Event Category

Past event

Speaker(s)

Kaushal Kishore

IISER Bhopal

Moderator(s)

Oindrila De

Assistant Professor